

**NEPP ETW 2017**



# **Reliability Assurance of CubeSats using Bayesian Nets and Radiation-Induced Fault Propagation Models**

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
This work supported by NEPP and the NASA Reliability and Maintainability Program under Grant and Cooperative Agreement Number NNX16AR25G



# NEPP - Small Mission Efforts



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# Integrated System Design for Radiation Environments

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Requirements

Design

Reliability


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# Integrated System Design for Radiation Environments



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




# Integrated System Design for Radiation Environments



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
# Integrated System Design for Radiation Environments



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- **Reasons for Activity interaction**

- Commercial parts (COTS)
- Document-centric work flow to model-based system engineering
- Smaller teams
- System mitigation (for COTS)
- Shorter schedules for small spacecraft






# Demo Vehicle: CubeSats, VU/Amsat AO-85 Results




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- Launched October 8<sup>th</sup>, 2015 as part of ELaNa-XII
- 800-500 km, 65° inclination orbit
- Carries 65nm SRAM SEU experiment



Geolocation of SEUs






# Radiation Reliability Assessment of CubeSat SRAM Experiment Board




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- **Assessment completed on REM**
  - 28nm SRAM SEU experiment
- **Reasons for integrated modeling**
  1. Use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts
  2. System mitigation of SEL
  3. System mitigation of SEFI on microcontroller



Courtesy of AMSAT






# System-level RHA: Block Diagram of 28nm SRAM SEU Experiment



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




# Overview of Model Integration of SysML, GSN, BN



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
# Overview of Modeling Approaches Used



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
## SysML

- Specification of systems through standard notation
- Added fault propagation paths




## GSN

- Visual representation of argument
- Goals, Strategies, and Solutions



## BN Network

- Nodes describe probabilities of states
- Calculate conditional probabilities from observations






# Integrated Model-Based Assurance Path

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## Objectives

- Obtain systematic coverage of possible faults
  - Move towards quantitative assessment of risk/reliability
-



# Goal Structuring Notation (GSN): Visual Representation of an Argument



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**Strategy:**  
Reasoning  
step, nature of  
argument

**Goal:**  
Claims of the  
argument

**Justification:**  
Explain why a  
claim or  
argument is  
acceptable

**Assumption:**  
Needed for goal  
or strategy to be  
valid


**Solution:** Items of  
evidence. Test  
reports linked.

**Context:** How the  
claim or reasoning step  
should be interpreted.  
Can be linked to  
documents or other  
models.

**M of N options:**  
M out of N paths  
can be  
completed to  
prove goal

**Supported by:**  
Inferential or  
evidential  
relationships

**In Context of:**  
Contextual  
relationships





# NASA Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) Template



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- **Old Paradigm: Reliability proven through list of tests passed**
- **Proposed New Paradigm: NASA Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) Template created to change reliability requirements to be objective-based (Groen, RAMS 2015)**
  - Based on Goal Structuring Notation
  - Created with Class A Missions in mind
  - Graphical structure to reliability requirements allows for integration with MBSE

Objective: System remains functional for intended lifetime, environment, operating conditions and usage

Context: Description of operating environment, including static, cyclical, and randomly varying loads

Strategy: Understand failure mechanisms, eliminate and/or control failure causes, degradation and common cause failures, and limit failure propagation to reduce likelihood of failure to an acceptable level

Strategy: Accesses quantitative reliability measures and recommend or support changes to system design and/or operations

R&M Template (Groen, RAMS 2015)

- **Can an assurance case for the radiation-reliability of a sub-Class D mission be made? Is it useful?**





# Top Level GSN Model of REM Experiment Board



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- **Top level goal:** Complete science mission objective
- **Strategies:** Provided functionality and mitigate radiation environment
- **Goals:** Validation of “Nominal” and “Mitigation” functionalities
  - Focused on radiation-induced faults






# GSN Models for Single Event SRAM Experiment




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
## Validate Nominal Functions



## Identify Component Susceptibility



## Validate Mitigation Functions







# SysML Block Diagram of REM Experiment Board



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





# SysML Block Diagram of REM Experiment Board



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Focus on  
Load Switch,  
SRAM  
subsystem






# SysML Internal Block Diagram with Fault Propagation Paths



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- **Fault (F)** Change in physical operation, depart from nominal
- **Anomaly (A)** Observable effect or anomalous behavior from fault
- **Response (R)** Intended response of component to A and F (mitigation)






# Fault Model – Load Switch



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## Load Switch



- A **LowInputVoltage** anomaly (from another component) leads to appropriate **Nominal** response from **PowerCutOff** function, leading to **PowerDisconnect**
- A **HighCurrent** anomaly (from another component) leads to appropriate **Nominal** response from **PowerCutOff** function, leading to **PowerDisconnect**

- **TID** fault could affect load switch response, leading to **Degraded** **PowerCutOff** functionality
  - **LowInputVoltage** anomaly could be passed on to the component downstream
  - **HighCurrent** anomaly may not be detected or cutoff





# SysML Internal Block Diagram with Fault Propagation Paths



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- **SRAM**

- Effects (E) impact on functionality
- Faults/Anomalies flow through ports to affect other components






# Fault Model - SRAM



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## SRAM




- SEL, TID faults could lead to **HighCurrent** anomaly
- **HighCurrent** failure-effect is output to other components through the **Vdd** power-port
- SEU, SETOnDataDuringWrite faults could lead to **CorruptedDataStored** anomaly
- PowerDisconnect, LowVoltage, IncorrectInput failure-effects from other components could also lead to **CorruptedDataStored** anomaly
- **CorruptedDataRead** anomaly results from **CorruptedDataStored** anomaly as well as **SETOnDataDuringRead** fault. Further, it leads to output of **BadData** failure-effect
- **StoreAndRetrieveData** functionality can be degraded (Effect node) due to **HighCurrent** as well as **CorruptedDataStored** anomalies



# Fault Model – SRAM cntd.



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- SETOnControl fault could lead to ReadDuringWrite and WriteDuringRead anomalies, which could lead to WrongWordWritten anomaly.
- ReadDuringWrite could lead to HighCurrent anomaly.
- WrongInput failure-effect from other components to Control or Address ports could lead to WrongWordWritten or WrongWordRead anomalies.
- SETonAddress fault could lead to WrongWordWritten or WrongWordRead anomalies.
- StoreAndRetrieveData functionality can be degraded (Effect node) due to HighCurrent as well as WrongWordWritten anomalies.




# Custom Modeling Environment - WebGME



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- WebGME is used to develop the modeling framework
- Models include:
  - Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
  - System model (SysML)
  - Fault Propagation
  - Function/Behavior Models
- Allows for links across models
- Links to external documents

<https://webgme.org/>






# Model-Based Assurance Case (MBAC+ (=WebGME)) for Radiation Hardness Assurance Activities



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- Tutorial at **NSREC 2017 Tuesday, July 18<sup>th</sup>**, during lunch
- Learn how to use NASA's Reliability and Maintainability Template to construct a radiation reliability assurance case
- Modeling environment also supports SysML Block Diagram modeling with fault propagation (no Bayesian nets yet)
- Browser based
- Free non-proprietary site hosted on Amazon (AWS) (like Crème)
- Free images of site for proprietary or export controlled modelling for hosting on Amazon GovCloud or internal servers





# Bayesian Network Models



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## BN Structure


- Node are probabilistic or deterministic variables in a domain
- Nodes can also be discrete or continuous.
- Directed edges capture the dependency relationship between the nodes

## BN Parameters

- State of a probabilistic nodes are expressed as probability (or probabilistic distribution)
- Dependency relationship of a child node on its parents is expressed in terms of conditional probability tables (or likelihood functions)

## BN Inference

- The BN inference process estimates the probabilistic distribution (posterior) of each node, when the states of certain nodes are fixed (observation/ evidence)





# Development of Bayesian Network Models from SysML



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## SysML models

- Architecture, Fault Models
- Functional requirement models

Traverse design model from each fault to generate flat causal relationship graph.

For each component/subsystem sub-graph, add functionality (leaf node) based on functional model (if not present).

Merge common nodes across fault paths - faults, anomalies, functional effects and responses.

Add additional edges based on functional dependency. Add additional nodes (edges) for higher level functions (functional model).

Prune graph based on expert knowledge, convenience etc.



Identify states, likelihood relations, prior and conditional probabilities.



# SysML Fault Models SRAM/Load Switch Sub-System



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Detailed fault models shown in expansion of boxes




# Bayesian Network SRAM/Load Switch (1/3)



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## Deterministic Node Description:

- **MissionTimeElapsed:** Time elapsed in the mission can be set to any of the following states
  - < 1 year for Low TID
  - 1-2 year for moderate TID
  - > 2 year for High TID
- **SingleEventEnvironment:** The current environment can be set to any of the following states
  - Low Rate Region: Low probability of SEE occurrence.
  - South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA): Greater probability of SEE occurrence





# Bayesian Network SRAM/Load Switch (2/3)




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## Probabilistic Nodes Description (1/2):

Probability of ...

- TID : Presence/level of TID
- SEL: Occurrence of Latch up
- Current: Supply current being in spec
- Temperature: Load Switch temperature being in spec.
- Vin: Load Switch input voltage being in spec
- LoadSwitchOperation: Quality (“success”) of load switch operation to cut off power





# Bayesian Network SRAM/Load Switch (3/3)




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## Probabilistic Nodes Description (2/2):

Probability of ...

- SEL: Occurrence of Latch up
- SEU: SRAM- occurrence of upsets
- SET\_x (x=control, address, data): SRAM - occurrence of transients on control, address, data ports
- Input: Incorrect input to SRAM
- Vdd: Input Power to SRAM being correct or low
- Data: SRAM data being correct or corrupted
- Word: SRAM words being correct or wrong
- SRAMData: SRAM Data being correct






# Bayesian Network Inference – Case 1



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## BN Inference – Case 1


- MissionTimeElapsed (< 1 years)
- SingleEventEnvironment (low-rate region)
- Evidence : Input = Correct



# Bayesian Network Inference – Case 2



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## BN Inference - Case 2


- MissionTimeElapsed (< 1 years)
- SingleEventEnvironment (SAA)
- Evidence : Input = Correct





# Inference with Pruned Bayesian Network

- BN Pruned based on
  - Load Switch operates correctly for mission time of 2 years
  - **Remove Load switch portions**
  - 2. SET probability of affecting SRAM is very little
  - **Remove SET\_\* nodes**
  - 3. Input to SRAM is correct
  - **Input (data)= Correct**
- SEE environment set to LEO or SAA
- Shows sensitivity of SRAM data to SEE environment





# Transition and Related Work with JPL



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## Related Project with JPL

- Command and Data Handling (C&DH) Board
- Build reliability models and Safety case for subset of C&DH functions



Lunar Flashlight  
6U Form Factor

“CubeSat flight system development for enabling deep space science,” T. Imken et al, IEEE Aerospace Conference 2017

## Sphinx C&DH Board





# Summary



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- Developed integrated process for model-based assurance case for radiation reliability
- Constructed example SysML models augmented with radiation-induced faults and propagation
- BN inference “observations” used to assess impact of various faults on SRAM performance

