



# Radiation Effects and Analysis Lessons: a Scientist's Field Instruction to Explain Radiation Testing

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This presentation was compiled for  
The NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program by:

**Edward J. Wyrwas**

edward.j.wyrwas@nasa.gov

Science Systems and Applications, Inc. (SSAI)

work performed for NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)

**Ted Wilcox**

ted.wilcox@nasa.gov

Associate Branch Head, Code 561

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)



# Acronyms

3D	3-Dimensional (3D)
AI	Artificial Intelligence (AI)
AKA	Also Known As (AKA)
ARC	Ames Research Center (ARC)
Arms	Root Mean Square Current in Amps (Arms)
BGA	Ball Grid Array (BGA)
BOK	Body of Knowledge (BOK)
Caps, C	Capacitor (Caps, C)
CMOS	Complimentary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
COTS	Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)
CREME-96	Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics 1996 Revision (CRÈME-96)
DDD	Displacement Damage Dose (DDD)
DFN	Dual Flat-Pack No-Leads (DFN)
DSEE	Destructive Single Event Effects (DSEE)
DUT	Device Under Test (DUT)
ECC	Error Correcting Code (ECC)
EMPC	Experimental & Mathematical Physics Consultants (EMPC)
ESD	Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
FET	Field Effect Transistor (FET)
FTP	File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
FWHM	Fixed Width at Half Maximum power (FWHM)
GCR	Galactic Cosmic rays (GCR)
GEO	Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)
GPIO	General Purpose Input Output (GPIO)
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)
GSFC	Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
HDPE	High Density Polyethylene (HDPE)


HPC	High Performance Computing (HPC)
I, V, P	Current, Voltage, Power (I, V, P)
ID	Identifier (ID)
IP	Intellectual Property (IP)
JEDEC	Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC)
JESD	JEDEC Standards (JESD)
JPL	Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL)
JSC	Johnson Space Center (JSC)
KVM	Keyboard Video Mouse (KVM)
L	Inductor (L)
LDC	Lot Date Code (LDC)
LET	Linear Energy Transfer (LET)
LPDDR4	Low-Power Dual Data Rate Random Access Memory, Generation 4 (LPDDR4)
MAPLD	Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD)
ML	Machine Learning (ML)
MOSFET	Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor (MOSFET)
NASA	The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
NDSEE	Non-Destructive Single Event Effects (NDSEE)
NEPP	NASA Electronic Part and Packaging (NEPP) Program
NRL	Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
NSRL	NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL)
PCB	Printed Circuit Board (PCB)
PCBA	Printed Circuit Board Assembly (PCBA)
PMIC	Power Management Integrated Circuit (PMIC)
PoP	Package-On-Package (PoP)
RAM	Random Access Memory (RAM) - AKA system memory
REAG	Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)

RIC	Radiation-Induced Conductivity (RIC)
ROM	Read Only Memory (ROM) - AKA program memory
SBC	Single Board Computer (SBC)
SEB	Single Event Burnout (SEB)
SEFIs	Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs)
SEGR	Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)
SEL	Single Event Latchup (SEL)
SET	Single Event Effect induced transients (SET)
SEU	Single Event Upsets (SEU)
SI	International System of Units (SI)
SiP	System-In-Package (SiP)
SoC	System-on-Chip (SoC)
SOI	Silicon on Insulator (SOI)
SOTA	State of the Art (SOTA)
SPE	Solar Proton Events (SPE)
SRIM	Stopping and Range of Ions in Matter (SRIM)
SSAI	Science Systems and Applications, Inc. (SSAI)
TAMU	Texas Agricultural & Mechanical University (TAMU)
TID	Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
TM	Technical Memorandum (TM)
TPA	Two-Photon Laser absorption (TPA)
TPU	Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)
TSV	Through Silicon Via (TSV)
VDD	Drain Voltage (VDD)
VSS	Source/Sink Voltage (VSS)



# Radiation Assurance Requires Synchronous Integration

*This is why radiation engineers tend to answer with “it depends...”*



- Considerations summarized in these elements allow designers to effectively choose parts for their best performance for a given architecture
- Comprehension requires a complete synchronous picture of how technologies are to be used effectively
- Emphasizing one of these elements without understanding the others can compromise the integrity and performance of the parts and mission success

Image credits: NASA and other government sources





# NEPP Processor Enclave

- State of the Art (SOTA) computational devices exist as individual semiconductor components yet require other devices to operate in a realistic system.
- The **Processor Enclave** is intended to be better nomenclature to categorize these types of compute devices, including compute devices that are System-In-Package (SiP), Package-On-Package (PoP), or monolithic devices which employ SOTA heterogeneous process integration to achieve a system within one device package.
- While Graphics Processor Units (GPUs) are the primary technology being characterized in this NEPP subtask, the GPU is a general-purpose compute component, and its **relevant technology competitors need to be evaluated** such as Systems on Chip (SoC), microprocessors and artificial intelligence (AI) capable devices.
- In these slides we provide a glimpse into the challenges associated with performing radiation testing on High Performance Computing (HPC) and Neuromorphic Computing devices.
- **These slides provide a high-level overview for an approximation of our radiation assurance process.**



# Design Characterization & Qualification Trade Space



Based on ISO 26262-11:2018(E)  
Figure 2. “A semiconductor, its parts and subparts”

The higher we go in abstraction,  
the farther we are from the Device Under Test (DUT)




# Miniaturization Trends

- The trend in microelectronics has always been toward miniaturization, improvements in transistor density (quantity per  $\mu\text{m}^3$ ), and power efficiency.
- Because we need our electronics to do more things, state of the art technologies aim to heterogeneously integrate many capabilities into small discrete components with ever increasing quantities of input and output signals.
- To accomplish this feat, component package configurations must evolve in at least the same velocity leveraging all 3 dimensions. This has permitted computers to shrink from room-sized to palm-sized in just a few decades while their complexities and capabilities have increased tremendously from basic calculations to running most of the modern world.
- Moore's Law has historically been the colloquial term associated with scaling technology smaller as time moves forward. Gordon Moore (co-founder of Intel) spoke about an observation he made in 1965 that "the number of transistors on a microchip would double about every two years, while the cost of computers is halved" because of improvements in manufacturing technology.



# Component Packaging Technology

- Coinciding with Moore's Law have been developments in two adjacent industries which impact how the semiconductor devices are physically used. The semiconductor device is called the **die**, as it **is diced from a larger wafer of material**.
  - The circuit board industry has developed multiple substrate material options (e.g., epoxy, glass, polyimide) to reduce size (notably thickness) and increase functionality such as flexibility
  - Device integrators have invented interconnect systems (e.g., bond wires, solder bumps) which connect the miniature metallization to the circuit boards and have reduced the overburden (e.g., over-mold, encapsulant, passivation coatings) that provides thermal relief, fire retardants, and protection from environmental stressors such as moisture and chemicals. The latter is called the component package, and in some cases, there isn't one (i.e., chip-on-board).
- To address the needs of converging commercial market segments, component packaging technology has developed in favor of modular, multifunctional system blocks that ease integration, shorten product design cycles, and permit automated assembly (aka attaching the devices to the circuit board).






# What is a DUT Really?

- The Device Under Test (DUT), or electronic item we intend to test, is the transistor layers of the semiconductor die. We call these layers (which typically extend to nearly the edges of the die) and their corresponding thickness the sensitive volume of a device.
- The die is often embedded in plastic molding compound, ceramic cavities, or found on organic (small chain polymer) substrates, sometimes with a metal lid over top of it.
- A Neuromorphic Computing example is the Google Coral Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) module which is used for tensorflow-lite inferences.
  - Organic substrate module circuit board with a backfilled lid cavity and copper heat spreader. The backfill is plastic molding compound that fills the entire cavity. Not only is there a 5x5mm TPU die inside the package, but also a power management die, a crystal oscillator, and at least a dozen passive components.

10mm



15mm



DUT is found within the 5mmx5mm die, outlined here

Left: Photo  
Right: X-ray

Images courtesy of NEPP








# Component Packaging vs Sensitive Volume



We had to design and fabricate a PCB to use the component



Component of interest (TPU die) is a 5x5mm flip-chip (aka upside down die with underside metallization) within the plastic encapsulant, ~500um beneath a copper foil at the top of the packaging lid.




Images courtesy of NEPP



# SOTA Packaging

- State of the Art (SOTA) packaging, while it permits higher performance computing, it introduces significant challenges in the techniques and methodologies used by radiation test designers.
- Metallization layers are a higher density barrier in the line-of-sight to reach the sensitive volumes.
  - Sometimes we can remove some layers, but we risk the integrity of the device
- Heatsinks, heat spreaders, and lidded components create additional challenges and prevent radiation from reaching the sensitive volume.
- These overlays prevent us from testing at many ground-based test facilities and do not stop radiation in space.



Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the 12<sup>th</sup> Space Computing Conference in Pasadena, CA. July 30 – August 1, 2019. STI DAA number 20190028690



# “Fault Tolerant Schemes” (1/2)

- High Performance Computing (HPC) Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) devices are extremely complex. Therefore, we map out system redundancies, and any features which promote error correction or parity.
- We have to ask questions:
  - Fault tolerance schemes; are they employed correctly?  
Are they used correctly/overloaded?
  - Does Error Correcting Code (ECC) improve or hurt radiation performance?
  - Will we have the ability to test with and without the mitigation in place?
  - What software frameworks and libraries must also run in the background in addition to their test software or scientific payload? Are any of these systemwide services prone to faults?



# “Fault Tolerant Schemes” (2/2)

- Upset tolerance is important. Mitigation schemes need to restore the system to a good state.
- It is important to understand when the mission-critical systems need to be available. There are many discrete time windows which exist during the mission, with different requirements. It is not appropriate to assume a complex device will be in the same computational state when radiation effects happen.
- Not all fault modes caused by radiation effects can be "injected" or mimicked easily. Charge spreading and diffusion to regions you can't control tend to reign supreme.
- It is hard or impossible to fully exercise the state-space to verify the tolerance. There are more ways to break something than we can usually test.



# Radiation Effects and Testing

- **Let's talk a bit about common space radiation phenomena and their associated tests**
- **Cumulative Dose Degradation**
  - Total Ionizing Dose (krads)
  - Displacement Damage Dose (MeV/g or neutron fluences)
- **Single-Event Effects**
  - Non-Destructives, e.g. analog or digital transients, upsets, resets, stuck bits, crashes...
  - Destructives, e.g. latchup, gate rupture, burnout, dielectric rupture...
  - Usually measured in rates of occurrence or probabilities of failure



# Radiation Effects in Detail


Radiation Effect	Displacement Damage Dose (DDD)	Total Ionizing Dose (TID)	Non-Destructive Single Event Effects (NDSEE)	Destructive Single Event Effects (DSEE)
Technologies Dominated by the Effect	Opto-electronics, Bipolar	Analog, CMOS, MOSFETs	All	All (e.g., CMOS→SEL, MOSFETs→SEB & SEGR)
Type of Effect	Cumulative (total particle fluences)	Cumulative (total particle fluences)	Instantaneous (one particle)	Instantaneous (one particle)
Why?	Damage cascades, disruption of the semiconductor lattice	Charge trapping (oxide/passivation/interface trapping especially)	Transient conditions: recombination and drift of charge carriers. Upsets that are persistent. Charge collection.	Semiconductor tolerances exceeded internally (current density, electric field strength, etc.)
What does that lead to?	Photonics and transparent material degradation	Threshold voltage shifts, leakage current	System and functionality drop-outs, some may require power cycle or reset	System and functionality failure
Radiation Source that Exhibits the Effects in an Isolated Fashion	Mid-energy protons (50-63 MeV p+)	Gamma source to create electron-hole pairs uniformly throughout the DUT	High energy protons or heavy ions for sufficient local charge deposition	Heavy ions
Other Sources that can also create the effect	Neutrons (difficult to count) or other energy protons (competing Coulombic interactions)	Protons, electrons, x-rays, heavy ions (physical coverage uniformity in question)	Protons, pulsed laser	Protons (competing with dose effects)

M. Campola (GSFC 561), Adapted from Avionics Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Guidelines NASA TM-20210018053. Table 7.4-1. SEE Type Susceptibility of Various Technologies and Part Types. And Table 9.2-1. Driving Factors for Radiation Testing and Analysis Methodologies.



# Sources of Ionizing Radiation

- **For space environments, we primarily look at:**
  - Galactic Cosmic Rays
  - Solar Particles
  - Trapped protons and electrons
  - Occasionally a human-made radiation source is relevant on the spacecraft as well





# Cosmic Rays


- Galactic Cosmic rays (GCR) originate outside the solar system, are highly-energetic, and are the most difficult to replicate on Earth.
- GCRs can have energies beyond 1 TeV; for reasons of cost effectiveness and practicality, ground-based SEE testing is performed with much lower energies, usually in the 10-25 MeV/nucleon range.
- Real cosmic rays have enough energy to penetrate an entire satellite, *but at ground testing we are often range-limited to hundreds of microns*
- The effects of space-based GCRs on our transistors are correlated to lower-energy ground accelerator beams with LET
- In space, we see a fall-off of particles with LETs over 30 MeVcm<sup>2</sup>/mg (supernova limit). Heavy ion facilities can go higher than this, and 75 MeVcm<sup>2</sup>/mg is a common measure of immunity for a part to a given SEE.





# Solar Particle Events



- **Solar flares and Coronal Mass Ejections**
  - These are discrete events with high fluxes of protons and heavier ions from the sun
  - Responsible for sudden disturbances from the “background” radiation environment and day-to-day upset rate
  - Fluxes can be quite high and will drive the “worst-case” single-event effects rate requirements
  - Also contribute significantly to cumulative dose, especially for missions beyond Earth orbit






# Trapped Particles

- Spacecraft in Earth orbit are subject to ionizing radiation from the Van Allen belts (trapped protons & electrons)
- This is a primary source of total ionizing dose for many LEO, MEO, and HEO missions
- Also contributes to single-event effects, particularly notable in the South Atlantic Anomaly



Solar Anomalous Magnetospheric Explorer (SAMPEX) Solid State Recorder



K. A. LaBel, et al., IEEE REDW, 1993.



# Terrestrial Effects

- **Terrestrial systems are also concerned with single-event effects:**
  - High-energy particles impact Earth's atmosphere and generate a variety of particles (e.g., neutrons) that can reach ground level
  - Local effects from radioactive impurities decaying in common materials
  - A valid concern for data centers, critical computing systems, and aerospace avionics amongst others
- **Nuclear power and physics research facilities have significant dose concerns for instrumentation and control hardware**




# Linear Energy Transfer (LET)

- LET characterizes the energy deposition from charged particles
- Based on average energy loss per unit path length (MeV/cm)
- Density (g/cm<sup>3</sup>) is used to normalize LET to the target material
- LET (MeVcm<sup>2</sup>/mg) is the average energy deposited per unit path length
- We often use terms like charge column or charge cone to describe the particle path and resulting localized electron-hole pairs

$$LET = \frac{1}{\rho} \frac{dE}{dx} \quad \left( \text{MeV} \frac{\text{cm}^2}{\text{mg}} \right)$$

**Units**

Density of target material




Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the 12<sup>th</sup> Space Computing Conference in Pasadena, CA. July 30 – August 1, 2019. STI DAA number 20190028690



# Single Event Latch-Up (1/3)

- **Single Event Latch-up (SEL) is a destructive effect that directly impacts system availability**
  - Results in a dead short between power and GND
  - Is the latch-up recoverable at all? If so, does it cause latent damage?
  - Can application sustain an upset and a reboot during the mission? What about during the critical time window where science should be happening?
  - *SEL can happen on day 1 or day 1000*



- **This is not the same as electrical latchup:**
  - “COTS are not intended to experience space related latch-up. They are able to receive Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) related latch-up through their packaging lead frame (x-y axis latch-up) and are tested for this. They are not tested for z-axis latch-up, which is what radiation does. It’s fault injection within the transistors, which are otherwise not accessible from outside its package.” (E. Kawam, Microchip, paraphrased from NEPP Processor Enclave teleconference 1/21/2022)
  - COTS devices are not designed for SEL tolerance or immunity. Limited latch-up mitigation is implemented to protect against terrestrial concerns like power supply-over voltage or ESD. High energy particles in space cause SEL by depositing charge vertically in a transistor → a different concern. (T. Wilcox, GSFC)

Image adapted R. Ghaffarian, Body of Knowledge (BOK) for Leadless Quad Flat No-Lead/Bottom Termination Components (QFN/BTC) Package Trends and Reliability. STI number 20160001774



# Single Event Latch-Up (2/3)

- **How do we identify if a HPC device is susceptible to SEL?**
  - The classical first question is “is it CMOS?” ← Probably yes for HPC!
  - Is it on an isolated process e.g. SOI? ← Possibly, but not likely
  - Is any data published on the part or process? ← Hit or miss at best
- **Where SEL data is published, care must be taken to evaluate both for applicability and against reliability and availability requirements.**
  - The classic approach is to prove immunity with very high SEL LET threshold
  - In many cases, immunity of an underlying technology is used in lieu of test data for COTS (e.g., bipolar-only or dielectrically isolated processes).
- **Shielding in a space environment is practical to reduce TID and DDD. It can reduce SEE rates, but most effectively for lower energy particles.**
  - High-energy galactic cosmic rays most capable of causing SEL are minimally affected
  - Numerous second-order concerns abound here. Additional secondary particles can also be cascaded if the shield is close to the die or cause dose enhancement effects\*.

S. H. Crain, J. E. Mazur, R. B. Katz, R. Koga, M. D. Looper and K. R. Lorentzen, "Analog and digital single-event effects experiments in space," in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 1841-1848, Dec. 2001, doi: 10.1109/23.983140.



# Single Event Latch-Up (3/3)

- **Often, testing is the only way to assure an SEL requirement is met for COTS high-performance computing devices.**
  - Our goal is to prove no SEL; our secondary objective is to identify how often, how to recover, and how destructive the effect is.
- **We have test standards and guidance to help, but often the implementation of each test is unique**
  - *ASTM F1192, JESD57A, JESD234*
  - *The “A” in MEAL is Application!*
- **Complete coverage of the die is challenging or impossible**
  - Typical requirements are  $10^7$  particles per  $\text{cm}^2$  to prove immunity – about  $10\text{um}^2$  per particle on average, for devices that feature upwards of 100 billion transistors



# Non-Destructive Single Event Effects

- **Single-Event Upsets:** a non-transient change of state in a memory structure
- **Single-Event Transients:** a brief analog or digital “blip” on a circuit element
- **Single-Event Functional Interrupts:** a recoverable loss of application functionality
- SEU Cross Sections ( $\sigma_{seu}$ ) represent the effective target area for given SEE error type, usually in  $\text{cm}^2$  or  $\text{cm}^2/\text{bit}$ .
- Key high-level metrics are LET threshold and saturated cross-section to begin estimating rates

$$\sigma_{seu} = \frac{\#errors}{fluence}$$





# Total Ionizing Dose

- Long-term degradation (or failure) effect
- Can be life-limiting for HPC devices, but not usually performance-limiting day-to-day
- In complimentary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) devices, like most HPC devices, ionizing radiation results in charge traps and interface traps that cause the threshold voltage of the transistor to shift left, effectively turning on N-type and turning off P-type transistors.
- Individual circuit blocks generally increase leakage current prior to functional failure; susceptibility can vary tremendously based on transistor geometry
- Dose is measured in rad or gray



# Common Types of HPC Radiation Tests

## Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Testing

- Frequently performed with gamma rays, x-rays, and protons.
- Characterizes long-term parametric degradation or functional failure of a device.
- Determines whether dose-rate sensitivity exists.
- Common; owned by government labs, universities, and private radiation testing companies

## Heavy-ion SEE Testing

- Fully explore effects at different energy levels (cross section vs. LET)
- If effects are observed below  $20 \text{ MeV}\cdot\text{cm}^2/\text{mg}$ , proton testing may be necessary
- Typically the ideal test for SEU, SET, SEFI, SEL, SEGR, SEB
- Limited medium-energy cyclotron facilities available

## Proton SEE Testing

- High-energy ( $\sim 200 \text{ MeV}$ ) often used for SEE testing -- secondary products with moderate LET are created when primary protons interact with semiconductors and packaging materials.
- Ideal for testing full systems, boards, or boxes, but with tradeoffs
- Limited information provided for SEL or SEGR/SEB
- Primarily provided by medical facilities

## Pulsed Laser Testing

- A useful analog for heavy-ion testing; offers spatial and temporal resolution of errors
- Challenging to generate on-orbit rate estimates, but convenient for parts screening and design or mitigation evaluations



# Pros and Cons of SEE Test Selection

## Heavy-ion testing

- Generally requires decapsulation, die thinning, and thermal relief (for HPC components)
- Large selection of LET, sufficient ion range at most facilities (hundreds of um), broad die coverage
- Best for estimating on-orbit performance accurately

## Proton testing

- Broad beam ( $\sim 400\text{cm}^2$ ) or collimated  $\sim 1\text{-}2\text{cm}^2$ ; test whole boards or piece parts
- Dependent on indirect ionization; a spectrum of LET are generated for each test
- Secondaries up to  $15\text{ MeVcm}^2/\text{mg}$  possible, but limited amount at the high LET limits effectiveness for testing destructive SEE requirements
- High accumulated dose, activation of test setup – especially metal heat sinks
- Often the simplest test preparation – place board in front of beam, hit go. But, the range of protons can work against you, striking more of your test setup than you expected!


## Pulsed Laser Testing

- Requires decapsulation, thinning and polishing
- Hard to draw direct comparisons to on-orbit performance
- Very focused energy deposition (1 micron), but spatial and temporal localization of events
- Equipment is commercially obtainable




# Coverage of Secondaries versus Heavy Ions



1E10 200 MeV protons/cm<sup>2</sup>



1E11 200 MeV protons/cm<sup>2</sup>



1E12 200 MeV protons/cm<sup>2</sup>



Coverage from  
1E7 ions/cm<sup>2</sup>  
Heavy Ions


**The takeaway here:**

- Protons must induce secondary fission reactions within the materials in the die to cause a proper upset. For the same probability or quantity of upsets, it takes much fewer heavy ions than protons.
- While heavy ions cost more, they take less time to cause an error to occur. In testing, we want to induce errors – and capture that electrical behavior.



# Another Perspective on Interactions




## Prime Proton SEE Mechanism



**Reaction of protons interacting with semiconductor materials causes secondary recoil ions – Indirect Ionization**  
**Secondaries have various LETs and penetration ranges**  
**Courtesy Ladbury/NASA**




# Representative Facility Photos



- Not shown: Electrons, Gamma, Pulsed Laser



# No Human Presence While the Beam is Engaged



Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the 12<sup>th</sup> Space Computing Conference in Pasadena, CA. July 30 – August 1, 2019. STI DAA number 20190028690



# What About Software?


- A single board computer (SBC) has firmware, a boot loader, operating system, drivers, libraries, etc.
  - We try to control as many variables as possible; cross compiling code from a single code base or version-locking libraries and other supporting software
- While the usual “test as you fly” concept is most applicable to simple devices (i.e., operational amplifier), the more complex the device (i.e., GPU), the more challenging it becomes to design an appropriate test design (and build a reliable tester).
  - This is due to the accelerated nature of the SEE test versus space particle rates – actual flight designs might not be appropriate to gather sufficient information, nor to cover sufficient application state-space, nor to statistically cover all the functional blocks during short beam test run times.
  - It is important to note that due to the huge number of application options that modern complex devices are capable of, most SEU testing is geared to provide application-specific information.
  - Interpreting this data is challenging, at best, for other applications.
- “Test as you fly” may not be possible with higher complexity devices; Therefore, we often focus on simpler IP blocks with simple algorithms for HPC evaluations. When “test as you fly” becomes necessary, the test setup and support equipment are not trivial.





# Electrical Monitoring

- In addition to monitoring the outbound data from the device (e.g., accuracy, error, results), we try to monitor electrical and thermal readings from a variety of points within the test system



Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the NEPP Electronic Technology Workshop (ETW), Greenbelt, MD, June 15-18, 2020




Radiation Effects and Analysis Lessons: a Scientist's Field Instruction to Explain Radiation Testing. March 2022 Version. (REAL SciFI ExpRT 22).

The NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program. Edward Wyrwas (SSAI, Inc.). STI Number 20220002512



# Thermal Control

- Thermal control is a challenge in both directions – hot or cold.
- SEL testing is performed at worst-case hot temperatures, often requiring active heating for a low-power device
- COTS HPC devices often include heat sinks, heat spreaders, and/or fans. Removing these to facilitate radiation testing necessitates additional cooling, not heating!
  - Likely need to cool from back side of PCB
  - Testing in vacuum limits even passive cooling
  - Spare parts are often required to fine tune the cooling solutions.
  - A fine-tuned system also allows for testing at the HPC's rated temperature limit; decreasing the cooling until the desired temperature is achieved




Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the NEPP Electronic Technology Workshop (ETW), Greenbelt, MD, June 15-18, 2020

Radiation Effects and Analysis Lessons: a Scientist's Field Instruction to Explain Radiation Testing. March 2022 Version. (REAL SciFI ExpRT 22).

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# Material Degradation



- Materials can degrade, weaken or fail due to ionizing and non-ionizing radiation
- Transparent materials darken (e.g. windows, optics, lenses, photonics)
- Materials become brittle (e.g. wire insulation)
- Materials absorb charge (e.g. floating metal -> ESD risk)
- Examples shown are glass discs from the ESA RADGLASS study

High resolution images and reuse permission received from Ilias Manolis of ESA (Netherlands) and the ESA RADGLASS study.




# Dose Correlation

- Mid and high energy protons can also be used to impart TID upon a collimated target when the supporting circuitry requires the dose to be isolated to a small area of the test vehicle. This is challenging with gamma ray irradiators. (The changes between the rows are noted)
  - $1 \times 10^{11}$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup> at 200 MeV would deposit ~600 rad(Si) of dose
  - $1 \times 10^{10}$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup> at 200 MeV would deposit ~450 rad(Si) of dose
  - $1 \times 10^{10}$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup> at 63 MeV would deposit ~2000 rad(Si) of dose
- Dose rate is critical to TID irradiation; with gamma irradiation this is controlled by distance to the source and thickness of any Pb/Al shielding.
  - TID testing can take a range of time -- dose rates of 50-300rad(Si)/s for CMOS and Bipolar, and <.01rad(Si)/s for bipolar are standard



# Particle Range


- Terrestrial heavy-ion sources have limited range, but HPC devices are often thick and flip-chip.
- When die are thinned, we reduce the amount of material to which the particles travel through before they reach the sensitive volume
- Energy deposition and material stack-up calculations are performed using simulation software to determine the ranges of heavy ion particle types to see if they will reach the intended volume.
  - NASA Space Radiation Laboratory's (NSRL) range vs LET table below





# Limited Range Constraints

- Texas A&M University's Cyclotron – “Air testing”.



We read this chart type from right to left:

1. Beam leaves window,
2. then a point 3 cm in air is reached.
3. The particle deposits the most energy as it comes to a stop hence the Bragg peak.


Image reuse permission received from Dr. Henry L. Clark, Ph.D. Cyclotron Institute. Texas A&M University College Station, TX 77843.



# Spallation Concerns

- With accelerated particle testing there is scattering that happens along the perimeter of the beam outline due to the collimator and from the collisions of the particles on the metallization. This is a significant issue for proton testing.
- Instances of spallation increase as you go up in energy. It can be caused by species dependent features close to sensitive volume such as tungsten plugs.

Image courtesy of NEPP




The small tan, gray and black rectangles which dominant the board real estate are ceramic capacitors, film resistors and ferrite beads (mostly radiation immune)



# Test Flow & Fault Tree

- These qualitative bins are how we attempt to classify error signatures recorded during testing.
- A disturbance is not the same as an upset. There are recoverable errors, much like there are unrecoverable ones.




Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the 12<sup>th</sup> Space Computing Conference in Pasadena, CA. July 30 – August 1, 2019. STI DAA number 20190028690





# Identifying Patterns to Create Mitigation Solutions

- If we can identify an electrical behavior which indicates particle collisions are happening, then we can abort a computational routine to save the science payload or isolate the component in question.
  - For the NVIDIA TX2, we can simply monitor current consumption against a threshold. When that threshold is exceeded, we disregard the current computation, reset the system to prevent bad data, and avoid a system crash.




Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' presentation from the 12<sup>th</sup> Space Computing Conference in Pasadena, CA. July 30 – August 1, 2019. STI DAA number 20190028690



# Proton Test Data Analysis

- We record:
  - the elapsed time (seconds)
  - at a given flux (known particles per second per unit area)
  - to determine the fluence (total quantity of particles delivered during the irradiation time per unit area)
- We simply count the errors and do some algebra – we plot cross section of each test trial. If we tested at different energies, a polynomial would emerge.
- We try to delineate between failure types – some failures may not be attributed to the component we are actually testing and are otherwise due to peripheral circuitry and bus controllers.
- If we are able to evaluate using different energy levels, then we can statistically plot the data to a Weibull or Bendel function and extract the statistical parameters.
- We then use Monte Carlo simulation software to do the mathematical correlation between test conditions and orbit conditions.

TX2i ID	Proton energies (MeV)	Total Fluence	Flux
200	60	1.95E9	4.3E6 - 4.7E6
201	60 and 120	2.25E9	2.1E6 – 9.9E6
202	120 and 200	2.23E9	4.0E6 – 7.2E6
203	200	4.37E9	3.5E6 – 9.0E6



Bendel 2 Parameters	
B = 2.81	A = 1.51

## NVIDIA TX2i 200MeV Proton Data



# Correlation from Test to Environment

- We use tools, such as CREME-96 hosted by Vanderbilt, to predict environmental conditions based on modelled data, and estimate single-event effect rate by incorporating experimental results from ground-based testing.
- These tools leverage historical environmental data to predict single event effects rates for various orbital inclinations and altitudes
- In many cases, we consider four scenarios which bound the worst cases of solar proton events (SPE) and galactic cosmic rays (GCR) [tabulated on the right] and use a shielding thickness of 100mil of Al for generic electronics boxes


1	Trapped Proton Min	
	Quiet Weather (Worst GCR)	
	Solar Min - Trapped Proton Min	
	Solar Max - Trapped Proton Min	
	Worst Week - Trapped Proton Min	7.5 days
	Worst Day - Trapped Proton Min	18 hours
	Worst 5 minutes - Trapped Proton Min	5 minutes
2	Trapped Proton Min	
	Stormy Weather (Worst SPE)	
	Solar Min - Trapped Proton Min	
	Solar Max - Trapped Proton Min	
	Worst Week - Trapped Proton Min	7.5 days
	Worst Day - Trapped Proton Min	18 hours
	Worst 5 minutes - Trapped Proton Min	5 minutes
3	Trapped Proton Max	
	Quiet Weather (Worst GCR)	
	Solar Min - Trapped Proton Max	
	Solar Max - Trapped Proton Max	
	Worst Week - Trapped Proton Max	7.5 days
	Worst Day - Trapped Proton Max	18 hours
	Worst 5 minutes - Trapped Proton Max	5 minutes
4	Trapped Proton Max	
	Stormy Weather (Worst SPE)	
	Solar Min - Trapped Proton Max	
	Solar Max - Trapped Proton Max	
	Worst Week - Trapped Proton Max	7.5 days
	Worst Day - Trapped Proton Max	18 hours
	Worst 5 minutes - Trapped Proton Max	5 minutes

<https://creme.isde.vanderbilt.edu/>



# Radiation Transport Modelling

- Top-level dose requirements are often generically determined with a dose-depth curve applicable to uniform sphere.
- For critical systems, sensitive components, or when operating in high-dose environments, a radiation transport analysis is often performed.
- EMPC NOVICE is a radiation transport code used at GSFC that allows complex shielding geometry to be accounted for through the use of CAD file input
- Total ionizing dose (TID) and Total Non-ionizing Dose (TNID) can be fine-tuned for specific points within instruments and spacecraft
- Often, over-conservatism can be reduced with judicious use of this technique



Hubble Space  
Telescope NOVICE  
CAD model

Adapted from M. Xapsos. How Long can the Hubble Space Telescope Operate Reliably? – A Total Dose Perspective. STI Document number 20160005759 and How Long Can the Hubble Space Telescope Operate Reliably?. STI Document number 20140017805.




# The Difficulty with Models

- Models may not be fully applicable for a given device architecture. They can be used to approximate.
- For HPC, hard to isolate architectural issues from process; radiation models are often process-oriented
- Models only work with what we know; HPC devices are deeply complex with limited public information
- Every NASA spacecraft is new technology. We build prototypes, but the flight design is often one of a kind. When technologies have been used previously, we can make some early assumptions based on similarity.
- There is always uncertainty:
  - Our radiation cross section results are only a slice of statistics – the radiation engineer must consider the uncertainty and bound risk
  - Each piece of the circuit hierarchy and system topology come with their own error bars and confidence levels
  - Availability/Survivability/Reliability estimates come with error bars
  - There is never one singular value that represents the reliability of a device indefinitely.



# CRÈME-96 for Survivability

- The following is a rather crude approximation of this statistical methodology:
  - When devices have quantifiable components, where we fully understand the physical relationship between transistor layout and the bytes they affect, we can determine an on-orbit single event effects rate per bit.
  - When we are testing a black-box component we may crudely consider the entire sensitive volume as 1 bit.
  - For Bendel parameters 1.51 and 2.81, we achieve the following results from CRÈME-96:



						Survivability at Quantity of days (Quarter Breakdown shown)											
	SEE/bit/day	# of bits / device	SEE/dev/day	SEE/bit/Total	SEE/dev/Total	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Solar Min	2.27E-03	1	2.27E-03			95%	90%	86%	81%	77%	73%	70%	66%	63%	60%	57%	54%
Solar Max	8.12E-04	1	8.12E-04			98%	96%	95%	93%	91%	89%	88%	86%	85%	83%	82%	80%
Worst Week	2.42483	1	2.42483	1.82E+01	1.82E+01	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Worst Day	1.01E+01	1	1.01E+01	7.55E+00	7.55E+00	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Worst 5 minutes	3.70E+01	1	3.70E+01			0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

$$Survivability = e^{(-rate\ per\ day * time\ in\ days)}$$



# But Aren't There Rules of Thumb?

- There are many variations in manufacturing
  - Equipment calibration, room conditions, mask set age, foundry staff
  - Substrate changes – Bulk Si, Silicon on Insulator (SOI)
  - Conductor changes – Al, Cu, Ag, Au, W, Alloys
  - Dielectric changes – SiO<sub>2</sub>, low-k (e.g., polyamide, air), high-k (i.e., hafnium based)
  - Gate Geometry changes – planar, fin, gate all around
  - Lithography sizes scaling smaller
- When we test parts, we try to procure enough components to achieve a small statistical bin to capture the smallest amount of variance – preferably to an individual Lot Date Code (LDC).
- For every example of a 'rule', someone in the radiation effects community can offer a counter example. There are far too many to list.
- Because of all these factors, there are No Rules of Thumb.
  - However, we have seen some trends between generations of specific (AKA “the same”) architectures when manufactures make singular process changes (e.g., shrink pattern by 30%, lower the voltage by 10%, same design but two different substrates)



# Trends and Opinions, Not Rules

- Bipolar and Analog devices have known degradation behavior and *tend* to be more susceptible to TID effects than modern, bulk, scaled CMOS devices; scaling of CMOS transistors has generally helped with TID response though CMOS *does* have Latchup and some total dose concerns
- Highly-scaled CMOS devices show increased sensitivity to SEE due to transistor threshold voltages and cell sizes being smaller
  - Was true until transistor geometry changed (planar vs fin vs column)
- There is not a voltage sweet spot for current consumption, supply voltages, or bias voltages – nor can we compare two different manufacturers in a single device category
- When electrical derating isn't possible because of the complexity of the device type (i.e., microprocessor), testing must evaluate the device as close to flight-like as possible from a standpoint of computational operation and memory access patterns
  - To assure the 'state machine' has been thoroughly explored
  - To assure we can see what pieces of the software workflow or program routine can successfully complete, can identify or capture errors, and handle interrupts
  - So that we can put together a plan to mitigate some, or all the negative effects imparted by the radiation





# Similar Experiences

- Ceramic capacitors found on many High-Performance Computing (HPC) devices
- Ceramic capacitor packages used on flight hardware are rarely smaller than 0805 (SI) / 2012 (metric) sizes (2.0mm x 1.2mm) due to their dense plates and high capacitances
- Radiation Induced Charge Loss
  - During radiation, the capacitor leakage resistance decreases. Therefore, the time constant of the circuit will also decrease. If the capacitor is in a critical timing circuit, the timing circuit may produce errors that affect system performance.
- Radiation Induced Conductance
  - The amount of radiation-induced conductivity (RIC) can vary widely with dielectric material type.
  - For a dielectric (insulator) the band gap is large relative to room temperature thermal energies, the valence band is full, and the conduction band is empty. This leaves no electrons available to participate in the conduction process. However, **in the presence of ionizing radiation** where the energy from the radiation that can be imparted to an electron exceeds that of the band gap, an electron may transition to the conduction band and electrical conduction will take place. This **can cause a catastrophic short circuit depending on the electrode spacing within the component.**

Adapted from Edward Wyrwas' Body of Knowledge for Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). STI Document number 20180006915.



# Old Trends, Far From Rules

- Silicon substrate changes: An evaluation of 45nm SOI multi-core processors has been conducted by university researchers from France. They compare their work to 45nm bulk silicon multi-core processors. In these tests, a 3-5X improvement to SEE immunity is seen when switching from bulk silicon to silicon on insulator for the same technology node.
  - Pabo Ramos, Vanessa Vargas, M. Baylac, F. Villa, S. Rey, et al.. Evaluating the SEE sensitivity of a 45nm SOI Multi-core Processor due to 14 MeV Neutrons. IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2016, 63 (4), pp.2193 - 2200. <10.1109/TNS.2016.2537643>. <hal-01280648>
  - S.S. Stolt and E. Normand, "A Multicore Server SEE Cross Section Model," IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 59, pp. 2803–2810, Dec. 2012.
- Voltage scaling accompanied with feature size scaling reduces the critical charge required to flip a bit. This allows even lower-energy particles to cause soft errors. Due to these reasons, soft-error rate at 16nm is expected to be more than 100X than that at 180nm
  - S. Mittal et al., "A Survey of Techniques for Modeling and Improving Reliability of Computing Systems," IEEE TPDS, 2015.
- Zhang et al. characterized soft error vulnerabilities across the stacked layers under 3D integration technology. They show that the outer dies can shield more than 90% particle strikes for the inner dies, which leads to a heterogeneous error rate across layers in a 3D chip.
  - W. Zhang et al., "Microarchitecture soft error vulnerability characterization and mitigation under 3D integration technology," in International Symposium on Microarchitecture, 2008, pp. 435–446.





# Understanding Risk

- A satellite has independent systems. The requirement of Avionics systems is to function and survive during the mission. It isn't checking in with the science payload and won't reset these systems 'along the way'.
  - Paraphrased from NEPP Processor Enclave teleconference 1/21/2022
- Historical data may not be related and therefore should not be considered as providing radiation assurance. This includes previous testing with neutrons, model correlations from different orbits, components with slightly different architectures, component generations with different lithography nodes.
- Extensive testing should always be performed to reduce risk.
- Questions should arise from testing:
  - Will the component meet its primary mission objective, aka will it still be functioning when it reaches its first rendezvous to do its activity? Are we able to fly powered off to extend survivability?
  - Will redundancy improve the survivability of the system?
  - What did we determine from the test results? Did we learn anything new? Are we able to quantify the unknowns?
  - Are we able to correlate the device's intended usage in a flight system to how we performed our test? (i.e., software applications and memory utilization)



# What Did We Learn?

- No rules of thumb in radiation effects
  - There are too many variables and manufacturing variations to have one standard model at any granularity in our abstraction diagrams
  - Through a campaign of lot-based testing, we can characterize the radiation tolerance of high-performance computing (HPC) and artificial intelligence (AI) devices with a high degree of confidence.
  - We use best practices and the knowledge of our entire radiation effects community to reduce risk associated with flying SOTA computational devices which subsequently improves mission assurance.



Based on ISO 26262-11:2018(E) Fig. 2



# Fin

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